TryHackMe // Nov 19, 2026

Carnage Write-up

WiresharkCobalt StrikePCAPBlue Team

Scenario: Eric Fischer from the Purchasing Department at Bartell Ltd received an email from a known contact containing a malicious document attachment. Upon opening it and clicking "Enable Content," his workstation began making suspicious outbound connections. In this investigation, we analyze the captured network traffic (carnage.pcap) to reconstruct the full infection chain, identify Cobalt Strike Command & Control (C2) servers, and uncover post-infection malspam activity.
Room URL: https://tryhackme.com/room/c2carnage

1. Scenario & Initial Triage

We start by opening carnage.pcap in Wireshark to examine the captured network traffic. Our first objective is to determine the exact timestamp of the initial HTTP connection to the malicious IP address.

Question 1

During initial inspection using the smtp filter, we observe email traffic containing a Base64-encoded ZIP attachment.

SMTP Stream

To pinpoint the initial web connection, we filter by the victim's source IP address and the http protocol. Next, we adjust Wireshark's timestamp settings under View -> Time Display Format -> Date and Time of Day to display the exact date and time of the first HTTP packet.

Wireshark Time Display Format

2. Malicious Payload Delivery

Next, we need to identify the name of the ZIP archive downloaded onto the victim's workstation.

ZIP Filename Question

By navigating to File -> Export Objects -> HTTP, Wireshark lists all transferred HTTP files. Packet 2173 reveals an application/octet-stream download named documents.zip hosted on attirenepal.com, which also answers the question regarding the hosting domain.

Export HTTP Object List

The next task asks for the name of the file contained inside documents.zip without downloading or extracting the archive locally.

Inner File Question

We isolate the download packet using the display filter:

http.content_type contains "application/octet-stream"

Following the HTTP stream (Follow -> HTTP Stream) and scrolling to the bottom of the raw ZIP binary data reveals the internal PKZIP header containing the embedded Excel spreadsheet filename.

HTTP Stream Inner File

Inspecting the HTTP response headers in the same stream reveals the web server software (LiteSpeed) and server metadata.

HTTP Response Headers

We are also asked to identify the exact version of the web server.

Webserver Version Question

Checking the X-Powered-By header within the HTTP response provides the exact PHP/server version details.

3. Multi-Domain Infrastructure

Malicious files were delivered to the compromised host from multiple domains. We need to identify all three domains involved in this delivery stage.

Three Domains Question

By sorting the packets chronologically right after the documents.zip download and enabling Wireshark's DNS name resolution, we can trace the subsequent DNS queries and TLS handshakes to domains such as finejewels.com.au.

Subsequent Domain Traffic DNS and TLS Handshake

Next, we need to determine which Certificate Authority (CA) issued the SSL certificate for the first domain identified above.

SSL CA Question

Searching for the domain on VirusTotal and checking the Relations -> Historical SSL Certificates tab for September 2021 reveals the issuer details (GoDaddy).

VirusTotal SSL Certificate

4. Cobalt Strike C2 Analysis

The investigation now shifts toward identifying the two Cobalt Strike Command & Control (C2) server IP addresses.

Cobalt Strike IPs Question

Opening Statistics -> Conversations in Wireshark and sorting by the highest packet volume from server to client highlights suspicious external hosts. Cross-referencing these domains and IPs in the VirusTotal Community tab confirms two Cobalt Strike C2 servers: 185.106.96.158 (survmeter.live) and 185.125.204.174 (securitybusinpuff.com).

VirusTotal Cobalt Strike Community Note 1 VirusTotal Cobalt Strike Community Note 2

With both C2 IP addresses confirmed, we need to extract the spoofed HTTP Host header used by the first C2 server along with the domain names associated with both IPs.

C2 Host Header and Domains Questions

Filtering for HTTP traffic directed to 185.106.96.158 (Frame 6326) reveals a GET /spfooh/cacerts.crl request masquerading with a spoofed Host: ocsp.verisign.com header—a classic Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profile technique.

Spoofed Host Header Packet

5. Post-Infection & Exfiltration

Next, we identify the domain involved in post-infection C2 communication.

Post-Infection Domain Question

Examining the HTTP traffic shortly after the initial payload execution shows ongoing communication with maldivehost.net and survmeter.live.

Post-Infection HTTP Traffic

We then need to find the first eleven characters sent by the victim host to the malicious post-infection domain.

First Eleven Characters Question

Filtering by the destination IP of maldivehost.net and inspecting the first outbound HTTP POST request (Packet 3822) reveals the URI path containing the transmitted string.

Outbound HTTP POST Packet

The following question asks for the packet length of this initial outbound C2 packet.

Packet Length Question

Looking at the Length column for Packet 3822 in Wireshark gives us the exact byte size (281).

Packet Length Inspection

Next, we check the Server HTTP response header returned by this malicious domain.

Server Header Question

Applying the http.response filter on the same IP address lets us inspect the server banner in the response headers.

6. IP Reconnaissance & Malspam

Before launching secondary spam campaigns, the malware checked the victim's public IP address via an external API. We need to find both the timestamp of the DNS query and the API domain queried.

IP Check API Questions

Using the DNS display filter below quickly isolates API lookups occurring after the compromise:

dns.qry.name contains "api"

Packet 24147 shows a DNS query to api.ipify.org at 2021-09-24 17:00:04.

DNS Query to api.ipify.org

Finally, the compromised host began sending out malicious spam (malspam). We need to identify the first MAIL FROM address observed and the total number of SMTP packets in the capture.

Malspam MAIL FROM Question

Filtering SMTP commands with the following expression reveals the sequence of spoofed sender addresses, starting with Packet 28576:

smtp.command_line contains "MAIL FROM"

SMTP MAIL FROM Filter

For the final question, we apply a simple smtp display filter and read the total count of displayed packets from Wireshark's bottom status bar.

SMTP Packet Count Question